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THE COURTS, NOT THE ARBITRATOR, MUST DECIDE CLASS ARBITRABILITY UNLESS CLEARLY AND 
UNMISTAKABLY GRANTED IN THE ARBITRATION AGREEMENT: A COMMENT ON 20/20 COMMUNS., 




I. INTRODUCTION  
 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recently determined that a court, not 
an arbitrator, needs to decide the gateway issue of class arbitration unless the arbitration 
agreement clearly and unmistakably grants this authority to the arbitrator.1 The court determined 
that class arbitration is considered a gateway issue, which is a threshold question of arbitrability 
because class arbitration fundamentally differs from individual arbitration.2 In 20/20 Communs., 
Inc. v. Crawford, there was a general delegation clause giving the arbitrator the power to decide 
arbitrability issues and the arbitration agreement incorporated the American Arbitration 
Association (“AAA”) rules providing that an arbitrator has the power to determine class 
arbitrability.3 However, because a clause that appeared to generally prohibit class arbitration 
existed in the arbitration agreement, it was determined that the courts, not the arbitrator had the 
power to determine whether class arbitrability could proceed.4 This ruling overturned the district 
court decision in 20/20 Communs., Inc. v. Blevins, which held that the arbitrator had been 
granted the power to decide the gateway issue of class arbitration.5 
 
II. CASE BACKGROUND 
 
20/20 Communications, Inc. (“20/20”) is a national company that primarily focuses on 
direct-sales and marketing.6 20/20 employs field sales managers.7 The field sales managers are 
required to sign a “Mutual Arbitration Agreement” (“MAA”) upon employment.8 The MAA was 
 
*  Andrew Peretin is the Comment Section Editor of the ARBITRATION LAW REVIEW and a 2021 Juris Doctor 
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1  20/20 Communs., Inc. v. Crawford, 930 F.3d 715, 721 (5th Cir. 2019).  
 
2  Id. at 718-19.  
 
3  Id. at 575. 
 
4 Id. at 721.  
 
5 20/20 Communs., Inc. v. Blevins, 357 F. Supp.3d 566, 570 (N.D. Tex. 2019). 
 
6  Crawford at 717.  
 
7  Blevins at 570.   
 
8  Id. (citing Mutual Arbitration Agreement). 
 





meant to be the sole agreement between 20/20 Communications and its employees for dispute 
resolution.9 
The MAA stipulated that the parties would submit any and all disputes and claims to 
arbitration.10 The agreement covered almost all claims, including: wages, overtime, benefits or 
other compensation, and breach of any express or implied contracts.11 Under the terms of the 
agreement, the Federal Arbitration Act and Texas law governed enforcement of the agreement 
and its ability to compel arbitration.12 The MAA further stated that the arbitrator is limited to use 
of the MAA and controlling law for determining disputed maters.13 In the process, the arbitrator 
should apply the American Arbitration Association’s (“AAA”) National Rules for the Resolution 
of Employment Disputes unless the rules conflict with the contract.14  
The agreement stated that the arbitrator has the ability to resolve the arbitrability issues if 
the parties disagree over the MAA’s formation or meaning.15 Last, and of most significance to 
the Fifth Circuit, the arbitration agreement stated: 
 
[T]he parties agree that this Agreement prohibits the arbitrator from consolidating 
the claims of others into one proceeding to the maximum extent permitted by law. 
This means that the arbitrator will hear only individual claims and does not have 
the authority to fashion a proceeding as a class or collective action or to award relief 
to a group of employees in one proceeding, to the maximum extent permitted by 
law . . . Employer may use this Agreement to defeat any attempt by Employee to 
file or join other employees in a class, collective, or join action lawsuit or 
arbitration, but the Employer shall not retaliate against Employee for any such 
attempt.16 
 
The purpose of the clause above was for 20/20 to expressly prohibit class arbitration and 
to prohibit the arbitrator from even having the authority to consolidate claims into a class. This 
demonstrates the party’s clear intent not to allow class arbitration to the extent that the laws 
allow this. 
 
9  Blevins at 570.   
 
10  Id. (citing MAA) (stating “Employee and Employer . . . both agree that all disputes and claims between them, 
including those related to Employee’s employment with Employer and any separation therefrom . . . shall be 
determined exclusively by final and binding arbitration before a single, neutral arbitrator . . . and that judgment upon 
the arbitrator’s award may be entered in any court of competent jurisdiction . . . Employer and Employee voluntarily 
waive all rights to trial in court before a judge or just on all claims between them.”) 
 
11  Id. at 571 (additionally the MAA claims covered discrimination, harassment, retaliation, violation of public 
policy, personal injury, and tort claims including defamation, fraud, and emotional distress). 
 
12  Id. (citing 9 U.S.C. § 1 et. seq.). 
 
13  Id. 
 
14  Id. 
 
15  Id. 
 
16  Id. (citing the MAA). 
 





From April 11, 2016 until May 13, 2016, eighteen field sales managers filed individually 
for arbitration.17 The individual claims stated that 20/20 failed to pay overtime compensation in 
violation of  the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”).18 Each individual employee demanded an 
arbitrator “with knowledge of employment law, specifically the FLSA, collective action under 
the FLSA and the National Labor Relations Act” to preside.19  
On August 5, 2016, 20/20 contended that one of the defendants amended their claim to 
assert a class action for arbitration after an initial case-management conference.20 In response, 
20/20 filed a suit (Blevins) seeking declaratory judgment on whether the court, not the arbitrator, 
should decide whether arbitration was available under the MAA; and whether class action was 
available in this case.21  
While the district court proceedings were pending, some employees requested that the 
arbitrators issue a statement that a class arbitration bar is prohibited under the National Labor 
Relations Act. (“NLRA”)22 Of the eighteen cases of arbitration filed, six arbitrators issued 
awards, and of importance, one stated that the class arbitration bar was unenforceable under the 
NLRA.23 20/20 filed a separate action (Crawford) in federal court to vacate the class arbitration 
bar under the NLRA.24 The district court rejected the request and confirmed the award in 
Crawford.25 Additionally, the district court in the first case Blevins, held that the arbitration 
agreement authorized the arbitrator, not the courts, to determine class arbitrability.26 The Fifth 
Circuit consolidated Blevins and Crawford for the purpose of appeal and decided that courts, not 
judges, determine the gateway issue of class arbitration in the absence of clear and unmistakable 
language granting the question to an arbitrator.27 
 
III. THE DISTRICT COURT PROCEEDINGS OF BLEVINS 
 
 
17  Blevins at 571.  
 
18  Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 201 et. seq.).  
 
19  Id. (citing Defs.’ App. To Mot. To Dismiss (doc. 69) 21-38).  
 
20  Id. 
 
21  Id. at 572. See. Blevins.  
 
22  Crawford at 717.  
 
23  Id. 
 
24  Id. 
 
25  Id. at 718.  
 
26  Id. 
 
27  Id. at 718, 715. 
 





In Blevins, the district court began its analysis by stating that Section 2 of the FAA 
governed.28 The court then stated that there is a strong federal policy in favor of arbitration and 
that “ambiguities as to the scope of the arbitration clause itself [must be] resolved in favor of 
arbitration.”29.  
The court summarized the arguments of both parties then examined the delegation-clause 
issue that it determined was key in the dispute.30 The court defined a delegation clause as “an 
agreement to arbitrate threshold issues concerning the arbitration agreement.”31 For delegation 
clause questions, the court performs a two part analysis that begins by asking whether the parties 
entered into any arbitration agreement at all.32 Then the court determines whether the agreement 
had a delegation clause.33  
In this case, the parties did not contest whether they entered into a valid arbitration 
agreement, so the court only needed to determine whether the MAA had a delegation clause.34 
The court found that the MAA had a delegation clause.35 The court’s analysis then was focused 
on whether the question of arbitrability fit within the delegation clause’s language.36 The court 
rephrased this and asked whether the delegation clause covered class arbitration, which is a 
gateway issue.37 Gateway issues are disputes that a court has the power to determine.38 Courts 
have this ability unless the parties clearly and unmistakably state that the arbitrator should 
determine the issue.39 In this case, the court held that the MAA met this clear and unmistakable 
standard and that the arbitrator should decide on the issue of whether the arbitration agreement 
 
28  Blevins at 573 
 
29  Id. (citing Mastrobuno v. Shearson Lehnam Hulton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 62 (1996) (quoting Volt Info Sci., Inc. v. 
Bd. of Trs., 489 U.S. 468, 476 (1989).  
 
30  Id. at 575.  
 
31  Id. (citing Rent-A-Ctr., W., Inc, v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 68 (2010)).  
 
32  Id. (citing Kubala v. Supreme Prod. Sers., 830 F.3d 199, 201 (citing First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 
U.S. 938, 942 (1995))).  
 
33 Id. (citing Kubala at 201 (citing Kaplan at 942)).  
 
34  Id. at 576.  
 
35  Id.  
 
36  Id. 
 
37  Id. 
 
38  Id. 
 
39  Id. (citing Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, 537 U.S. 79, 83-83 (2002)).  
 





would allow arbitration.40 The court came to this conclusion based on the following three main 
reasons.41 
 First, the court analyzed the plain meaning of the contract.42 The court noted that its 
objective was to determine the party’s intentions and to enforce the intentions as written when 
unambiguous.43 The court determined that the language of the delegation clause was 
unambiguous and it allowed for the arbitrator to determine disagreements related to the MAA’s 
formation or meaning.44 The court determined that the issue of whether a party may arbitrate as a 
class clearly concerns the MAA’s meaning and thus was reserved explicitly for the arbitrator to 
decide. 45 The court then cited the Supreme Court’s interpretation of similar contractual language 
in Rent-A-Center.46 In Rent-A-Center, the following clause was considered a delegation clause: 
“[t]he Arbitrator . . . shall have exclusive authority to resolve any dispute relating to the 
interpretation, applicability, [or] enforceability . . . of this Agreement.”47 The district court 
believed that the MAA’s language is similar to the delegation clause in Rent-A-Center, and that it 
gives the arbitrator the power to determine arbitrability issues.48 The district court determined 
that the court thus lacked the subject-matter jurisdiction to decide this issue.49 
Second, the court found that incorporating the rules of the AAA provided additional support 
for the interpretation that the arbitrator should decide the issue of class arbitrability.50 After the 
Supreme Court decided Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle., the AAA arbitration rules, including 
the specific action and separate Supplementary Rules for Class Action were enacted.51 Part of the 
AAA Employment Rules state that the arbitrator will apply the AAA rules if there is a material 
 
40  Blevins at 576 
 
41  Id. 
 
42  Id. 
 
43  Id. (citing Reliant Energy Servs., Inc. v. Enron Can. Corp., 349 F.3d 816, 822 (5th Cir. 2003)).  
 
44  Id. 
 
45  Id. (Black Law Dictionary 10th ed. 2014 defines a contract’s “meaning” as “that which is conveyed or intended to 
be conveyed by a written or oral statement or other communicative act.”).  
 
46  Id. (citing Rent-A-Ctr. at 68).  
 






50  Id. 
 
51  Id. (citing Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (2003)) (Bazzle involved contracts for a commercial 
lending company, that included arbitration agreements. The agreement stated that the parties agreed to submit all 
disputes, claims, or controversy relating to or arising from the contract to the arbitrator. The court held, in a plurality 
opinion, that an arbitrator must decide whether the contracts forbid class arbitration).  
 





inconsistency with the rules and the arbitration agreement.52 Further, Supplementary Rule 3 
contains the “Clause Construction Award” which lets the arbitrator decide whether to permit 
class arbitration based on the arbitration clause.53 
The court then cited the following Fifth Circuit cases that addressed incorporating the AAA 
rules as evidence that the parties agreed to arbitrate arbitrability.54 In Petrofac. Inc. v. 
DynMcDermott Petroleum Operations Co., the court held that adopting the AAA rules was clear 
and convincing evidence that the parties decided to arbitrate arbitrability.55 Additionally, in Reed 
v. Florida Metropolitan University, the Fifth Circuit held that the district court properly decided 
that the arbitrator should decide class-arbitration in this case because “the parties here consented 
to the Supplementary Rules, and therefore agreed to submit the class arbitration issue to the 
arbitrator.”56 The court thus decided to expressly decline 20/20’s proposition that the MAA’s 
preclusion to class arbitration overrides the Supplementary Rules of the AAA that was 
incorporated.57 
Third, the court found that the arbitration agreement’s broad language in favor of disputes 
being resolved through arbitration deprived the court of its ability to determine if class arbitration 
was allowed.58 The MAA stated that “all disputes and claims . . . shall be determined exclusively 
by final and binding arbitration . . . .”59 The Fifth Circuit, in Pedcor Mgmt. Co., Inc. Welfare 
Benefit Plan v. Nations Personnel of Texas, held that if an arbitration agreement that is disputed 
has broad language, including a contract clause that submits all disputes or claims arising or 
relating to the agreement to arbitrate, then class arbitration should be determined by the 
arbitrator.”60 The court stated that although the language in Pedcor is more narrow, the reasoning 
still held.61 
 
52  Blevins at 577 (citing AAA Employment Arbitration Rules and Mediation Procedures, R. 1 (Eff. Nov. 11, 2009)).  
 
53  Id. at 578. (citing the Supplementary Rules for Class Arbitrations at 3-4).  
 
54  Id. 
 
55  Id. (citing Petrofac. Inc. v. DynMcDermott Petroleum Operations Co., 687 F.3d 671, 675 (5th Cir. 2012)).  
 
56  Id. (quoting Reed v. Fla. Metro. Univ., 681 F.3d 630, 634 n.3 (5th Cir. 2012) (This case was abrogated on other 
grounds by Oxford health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 569 U.S. 564 (3013)).  
 
57  Id. 
 
58  Id. 
 
59  Id. (citing the MAA).  
 
60  Id. at 579 (citing Pedcor Mgmt. Co., Inc. Welfare Benefit Plan v. Nations Personnel of Texas, 817 F.3d 193, 196 
(5th Cir. 2016). (the case involved the Fifth Circuit analyzing an arbitration agreement with broad delegation 
language and determining whether the arbitrator should decide the issue of class arbitration).  
 
61  Id. see also Gonzales v. Brand Energy & Infrastructure Servs., Inc., No. H-12-1718, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
396335 at *5 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 20, 2013) (“holding that a class arbitrability question was to be resolved by an 
arbitrator due, in part, to an arbitration agreement’s inclusion of broad language”).  
 





Finally, the court disagreed with 20/20 and did not believe Epic Systems governs this issue.62 
In Epic Systems, the Supreme Court held that an arbitration agreement that required individual 
arbitration, rather than allowed class actions, was enforceable under the FAA.63 20/20 argued 
that Epic Systems created a rule that arbitration agreements that have a class-action waiver 
override provisions that could delegate questions of class-action to the arbitrator.64 The court did 
not agree.65 The court believed that Epic Systems only recognized the enforceability of class-
action waivers, but did not decide the question of who should resolve the arbitrability of class 
claims.66 The court also stated that the arbitrator may decide whether Epic Systems resolves the 
current issue.67 In conclusion, the court decided that whether the defendant should be able to 
proceed as a class is a decision for an arbitrator and not the court.68 
 
IV. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT’S ANALYSIS 
 
In Crawford, at the district level, the court rejected 20/20’s action to vacate the class 
arbitration bar declared by an arbitrator.69 20/20 appealed and the Fifth Circuit took the case.70 
After hearing oral arguments, the district court in Blevin held that the arbitrator and not the 
courts determined class arbitrability.71 The Fifth Circuit joined both cases for appeal.72  
The Fifth Circuit describes the two principle questions as whether class arbitration is a 
gateway issue which the courts should decide, and whether this arbitration agreement had clear 
and unmistakable language that the arbitrator should decide instead of the court.73 The Fifth 
Circuit noted that the Supreme Court has not decided if class arbitrability is a gateway issue.74 
The Fifth Circuit recognized that it has not yet addressed this issue.75  
 
62  Blevins at 578 (citing Epic Sys., Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1619 (2018)).  
 
63 Id. (citing Epic Sys. at 1632).  
 
64  Id. (citing Pl.’s Resp. to Defs.’ Mot. To Dismiss 28.).  
 
65  Id. 
 
66  Id. 
 
67  Id. 
 
68  Id. 
 
69  Crawford at 718. 
 
70  Id. 
 
71  Id. 
 
72  Id. 
 
73  Id. 
 
74  Id.; See Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 139 S. Ct. 1407, 1417 n.4 (2019). 
  
75  Id. 
 





The Fifth Circuit then noted that other circuit courts have all decided that class arbitrability is 
a gateway issue.76 The Fifth Circuit sided with the sister circuits and held that class arbitrability 
is a gateway issue that a court and not an arbitrator should decide unless there is clear and 
unmistakable language granting the authority to the arbitrator.77 The Fifth Circuit reasoned that 
class and individual arbitration differ in fundamental ways.78 
The Supreme Court has previously expressed the difference in form, that “[t]he class action 
is an exception to the usual rule that litigation is conducted by, and on behalf of, the individual 
named parties only.”79 The Fifth Circuit then asserted that there are significant practical and 
substantive consequences of class arbitration.80 The Fifth Circuit stated that class arbitration adds 
to not only the size, but also the complexity of arbitration.81 Additionally, due process concerns 
arise.82 As AT&T Mobility mentioned, the absent parties must “be afforded notice, an opportunity 
to be heard, and a right to opt out of the class.”83 This has the potential to increase the cost and 
compromise efficiency.84 The Fifth Circuit also recognized that privacy and confidentiality are 
key aspects of arbitration.85 Class arbitration could thus threaten parties’ perceived assumption of 
privacy and confidentiality.86  
 After determining that class arbitration is a gateway issue, the Fifth Circuit then turned to 
the question of whether the parties clearly and unmistakably agreed to have the arbitrator 
determine the issue.87 The Fifth Circuit quoted the following language from the MAA to 
demonstrate the party’s intent to preclude class arbitration: 
 
76  Crawford at 718. See Del Webb Cmtys., Inc. v. Carlson, 817 F.3d 867, 877 (4th Cir. 2016); Reed Elsevier, Inc. ex 
rel. LexisNexis Div. v. Crockett, 734 F.3d 594, 599 (6th Cir. 2013); Herrington v. WaterstoneMortg. Corp., 907 F.3d 
502, 506-07 (7th Cir. 2018); Catamaran Corp. v. Towncrest Pharmacy, 864 F.3d 966, 972 (8th Cir. 2017); Eshagh 
v. Termnix Int’l Co., L.P., 588 F. App’x 703, 704 (9th Cir. 2014) (unpublished); JPay, Inc. v. Kobel, 904 F.3d 923, 
935-36 (11th Cir. 2018).  
 
77  Id. Contra. JPay at 923; Wells Fargo Advisors, LLC v. Sappington, 884 F.3d 392, 27 (2d Cir. 2019) (concluding 
that a delegation clause is enough to give the arbitrator the power to decide class arbitrability).  
 
78  Id. at 719.  
 
79  Id. (citing Wal-Mart Stores. Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 348 (2011) quoting (Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 
682, 700-01 (1979))).  
 
80  Id. 
 
81  Id. See, e.g., AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 348 (2011) (stating class arbitration “makes the 
process slower, more costly, and more likely to generate procedural morass than final judgment”).  
 
82  Id. See, e.g., Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Crockett, 734 F.3d 594, 598 (6th Cir. 2013); Catamaran Corp. v. Towncrest 
Pharm., 864 F.3d 966, 972 (8th Cir. 2017).  
 
83  Id. (citing AT&T Mobility at 349).   
 
84  Id. See, e.g., Catamaran at 972.  
 
85  Id. 
 
86  Id. see Stolt-Nielson S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 686 (2010); Catamaran at 971-72.  
 
87  Id. 
 






[t]he parties agree that this Agreement prohibits the arbitrator from consolidating 
the claims of others into one proceeding, to the maximum extent permitted by law. 
This means that an arbitrator will hear only individual claims and does not have the 
authority to fashion a proceeding as a class or collective action or to award relief to 
a group of employees in one proceeding, to the maximum extent permitted by law.88 
  
The Fifth Circuit concluded that this clause precluded class arbitration to the maximum 
extent of law and clearly demonstrated the party’s intent to disallow class arbitration.89 The Fifth 
Circuit found that categorically prohibiting class arbitration, and then vesting the arbitrator the 
authority to decide on class arbitration, was illogical.90 The Fifth Circuit held that there was not 
clear and unmistakable language which is required to give the arbitrator the authority to decide 
on class arbitration.91 
The Fifth Circuit recognized the three provisions cited by the employees.92 These included: 
the disagreement over issues of formation being decided by arbitrator; the incorporation of the 
AAA rules, which explicitly state that when the rules are inconsistent with the agreement, the 
agreement governs; and the clause that all disputes are determined exclusively by final and 
binding arbitration, noting that the clause begins with the phrase “except as provided below.”93 
The Fifth Circuit recognized that those provisions, separated from the class arbitration bar, 
could be construed as granting the arbitrator the power to decide the issue of class arbitration.94 
The Fifth Circuit also recognized Robinson, which stated that broad coverage language similar to 
the language in the provision, gives the arbitrator the power to decide the availability of class 
arbitration.95 The Fifth Circuit then stated that examining whether the three clauses on their own 
is enough to decide the question of arbitrability is not necessary.96 The Fifth Circuit decided that 
when the three provisions cited by the employees were compared with the class arbitration bar, 
none of the provisions contained the clear and unmistakable language necessary for the arbitrator 
to decide the issue of class arbitration.97 
The Fifth Circuit noted that two of the provisions have expressed exceptions that negate the 
provisions if they contradict with any other provision in the arbitration agreement, which the 
 
88  Crawford at 720 (citing the MAA).  
 
89  Id. 
 
90  Id. 
 
91  Id. 
 
92  Id. 
 
93  Id. (citing the MAA). 
 
94  Id. 
 
95  Id. (citing Robinson at 196).  
 
96  Id. at 721.  
 
97  Id. 
 





court found they clearly do.98 Additionally, the Fifth Circuit does not think the exception clauses 
have the specificity required.99 In contrast, the class arbitration bar specifically prohibits class 
arbitration disputes.100 
In conclusion, because the provisions do not clearly and unmistakably give the arbitrator the 
authority to decide class arbitrability, courts, not arbitrators, are required to decide the issue of 




The major significance from 2020 Communs., Inc. v. Crawford case is that a class bar 
overcomes general delegation clauses and incorporation of the AAA’s rules and gives the courts, 
not the arbitrator, the power to decide class arbitrability. Significantly, the Fifth Circuit did not 
address whether the general delegation clause and incorporation of the AAA’s rules can give the 
arbitrator the power to decide class arbitration when no class bar exists.102 In order to draft an 
arbitration clause that allows an arbitrator to decide class arbitrability, general delegation clauses 
and AAA rules do not meet the standard of clear and unmistakable. Including a clause that states 
class arbitrability is delegated to the arbitrator as part of a delegation clause could help prevent 




The major critique in this case is that the plain language of the MAA appears to delegate the 
authority to resolve arbitrability questions to the arbitrator.103 In this case, the agreement contains 
a delegation clause, incorporates the AAA’s rules, and requires the parties to arbitrate all 
disputes.104 20/20 argues that the class waiver is controlling and shows clear intent to preclude 
class arbitration.105 However, the issue presented on appeal appeared to be whom parties 
delegated resolution of the issue of class arbitration to, not whether class arbitration is 
 
98  Crawford at 721. 
 
99  Id. 
 
100  Id. See, e.g., Baton Rouge Oil and Chem. Works Union v. ExxonMobil Corp., 289 F.3d 373, 377 (5th Cir. 2002) 
(“It is a fundamental axion of contract interpretation that specific provisions control general provisions.”) (citing 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 203(c) (“specific terms and exact terms are given greater weight than general 
language”)).  
 
101  Id. 
 
102  Crawford at 721.  
 
103  Brief of Appellees at 15, 20/20 Communs., Inc. v. Crawford, 930 F.3d 715, 721 (5th Cir. 2019) (Nos. 19-10050, 
18-10260), 2019 WL 1559393. 
 
104  Id. at 16. 
 
105  Id.  
 





allowed.106 Because of this, the issue of arbitrability should actually preclude the issue of 
whether class action is allowed.107 Even if there is a clear class action waiver, class arbitrability 
is still an issue that needs to be resolved separately and first.108  
Additionally, the Fifth Circuit has previously held that incorporating the American 
Arbitration Association rules is clear and unmistakable evidence that the parties agreed to 
arbitrate arbitrability.109 This combined with a delegation clause that gives the arbitrator the 
power to decide questions of arbitrability seem to indicate that an arbitrator should decide the 
issue. Even if a class bar is included, this clause should be interpreted by the arbitrator and the 




The Fifth Circuit declared that courts, not arbitrators, will decide the gateway issue of 
whether class arbitration is available unless there is a clear and unmistakable language that the 
arbitrator was granted this power.110 Additionally, general delegation clauses and incorporating 
the AAA rules is not enough to grant this power to the arbitrators when a class arbitration bar 
exists.111 
The Fifth Circuit does not address whether granting an arbitrator power to resolve 
arbitrability issues and incorporating the AAA rules, absent a class bar, grants an arbitrator the 
power to decide on class arbitration.112 The Fifth Circuit recognizes that the above provisions 
could potentially grant an arbitrator the ability to decide gateway issues such as whether class 
action is available.113  
 
 
106  Brief of Appellees at 16, 20/20 Communs., Inc. v. Crawford, 930 F.3d 715, 721 (5th Cir. 2019) (Nos. 19-10050, 
18-10260), 2019 WL 1559393. 
 
107  Id. 
 
108  Id. at 29-30 (citing Pedcor at 360) (stating “[Even] if the arbitration provision clearly did forbid class arbitration, 
then the arbitrator could – and [] should – make this call without any prior analysis by a court.”). 
 
109  See, e.g. Arnold v. Homeaway, Inc., 890 F.3d 546, 553 (5th Cir. 2018); Petrofac at 675 (both cases holding that 
incorporating the AAA rules showed the parties had clearly and unmistakably agreed to arbitrate arbitrability).  
 
110  Crawford at 721.  
 
111  Id. at 720.  
 
112  Id. 
 
113  Id. 
